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The Theory and History of Authenticity 
 
The Social Origins of Authenticity  
What actual circumstances favored the rise of authenticity as a vital goal in 
today’s society?  Lionel Trilling attempted to answer this question when he described the 
growth of authenticity out of the simpler and more modest virtue of sincerity, which itself 
arose in response to the momentous shift out of Feudalism. i  According to Trilling, the 
concept of sincerity first emerged as a precursor to authenticity in the 16th century as a 
result of the gradual breakup of the face-to-face relationships of traditional European 
society.  As was the case in many other premodern traditional societies around the world, 
the highly personalized universe of Medieval Europe was held together by a taken-for-
granted social order that provided its members with secure positions in a divinely 
sanctioned hierarchy. Local authorities served church and state, and were served in turn 
by their vassals. The family replicated this order, with the father exercising a sacralized 
authority.  This stratified and sanctified worldview validated the daily lives of the 
faithful. For most of those living in this cosmically ordained system, there was little or no 
travel away from their locality, and little or no social mobility within it.  Under these 
circumstances individuals were constrained by the obligations entailed in their 
predestined social roles. What mattered was not personal sincerity and purity of intent, 
but only whether persons were able to live up to their obligations to the neighbors and 
kinsmen they had known and who had known them all their lives. 
This stable world was transformed utterly by the breakup of the feudal system and 
the massive movement of individuals out of the countryside and into mixed urban 
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environments.  Henceforth, people were no longer quite sure where they belonged, what 
their futures held for them, or who their neighbors were. They had begun the irreversible 
plunge into modernity, which can be succinctly defined as the condition of living among 
strangers.  In this new, desacralized and unpredictable environment it became possible for 
some ambitious men and women to break out of their prescribed roles and pursue secular 
dreams of wealth, power, and fame.  But the pleasures and possibilities of social mobility 
coincided with feelings of alienation and meaninglessness, as well as the potential for 
guile and deceit.  Former inferiors could now pretend to be better than they actually were; 
origins could be hidden and high status positions claimed without any legitimate basis; 
neighbors could cheat and betray one another and vanish into the anonymous urban 
wilderness.  It is not surprising that the original definition of the villain was the 
dissembler, a lowly person who rises by cunning.ii  In this ambiguous milieu it is also not 
surprising that sincerity, doing what one says one will do, became a desired trait.  The 
erosion of a sacred hierarchy, the fragmentation of roles and the sense of a loss of 
significance were met by the sincere person’s reliance on inner integrity to establish 
trusting and meaningful relationships.  As Polonius advises his son: “To Thine own self 
be true and it follows as the night the day that thou canst not be false to any man”. 
This shift was supported by the dogmas of a newly rising Protestant bourgeoisie 
who had begun to transform the moral climate of Europe. The Protestants asserted that all 
persons are ultimately responsible for their own salvation. According to their doctrine, no 
one could intervene between the worshipper and God; no priest could interpret the 
confessions of the faithful and absolve them of their sins or sell them guarantees against 
damnation.  Instead, the members of the congregation had to become worthy of 
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redemption on their own.  This could only be accomplished by scrutinizing their souls to 
uncover and root out any evil impulses.  Since they were required to practice self-
interrogation and purification, the Protestant faithful tended to became urgently 
concerned about their own motivations:  for them, it was not enough to act morally, they 
now had to be certain that the intent behind the act was also wholesome.  As a result, 
sincerity became a defining virtue among this vanguard population.  
The rise of sincerity also correlated with the radical egalitarianism that was 
practiced and preached by Protestants, who not only defined themselves in opposition to 
the hierarchies of the Catholic church, but also against the formalities of a remote and 
increasingly illegitimate courtly society.  Instead of an ostentatious display of silks and 
jewels, they self-consciously wore plain clothing and appeared without adornment, 
revealing themselves in public ‘as they really were’.  Similarly, they made a practice of 
simple speech that did not employ any of the flattery and rhetorical flourishes of the 
gentry. But the requirements of modesty and sincerity had paradoxical consequences.  
The first was the ambiguity of representation.  How could persons thrown back on their 
own interpretations of themselves and their duties be certain that the appearance of 
sincerity was not actually the result of self-delusion and pride?  Couldn’t the 
unpretentious man actually be sinfully proud of his modesty, couldn’t the believer 
persuaded of his sincerity actually be the worst of hypocrites, capable of lying even to 
himself?   The second was the relation between the perception of inner truth and the 
demands of the social order.  Couldn’t being true to one’s own intuition of right and 
wrong be more important than conforming to what is required by society?  
Lindholm  Chapter 2 
 4 
Because their doctrine considered all human beings to be spiritual equals in the 
eyes of God, the most extreme Protestants even believed they could and should speak to 
aristocrats without honorifics or etiquette.  That this might lead to dire consequences did 
not matter to them; they would be rewarded in heaven.  Their critical attitude toward 
authority easily spread to self-questioning.  How are we to know what we are really like, 
and what God really demands of us?  Many Protestants tormented themselves with 
internal debates about these knotty matters of conscience, self-deception, and duty, as we 
know from the diaries and autobiographies that proliferated as an outlet for their spiritual 
anxieties. iii As a result, they were passionately concerned to discover an ultimate and 
absolute truth, outside of social norms and emotionally compelling.  This moved them 
away from the social virtue of sincerity and toward the more solipsistic goal of finding a 
guiding inner light – that is, of achieving authenticity. 
Support for this transformation came from another quite unexpected direction: 
scientific reason.  From the time of Galileo, thinkers had tried to make their findings 
based only on their own critical examination of the material at hand, carefully weighing 
and measuring claims against consequences. Scientific investigation required taking all 
the relevant data into account and ensuring that no emotional bias, prior authority, or 
false reasoning contaminated the conclusions. This skeptical practice was encapsulated 
by the slogan of the Enlightenment made famous by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804): Sapere 
aude – usually translated as ‘think for yourself!”  But Kant’s famous reference to the 
creative powers of personal imagination as the source point for true knowledge had been 
anticipated by René Descartes (1596-1650), who believed that true self could only be 
discovered by eliminating preconceptions and all social and personal convictions.   
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“I will now shut my eyes, stop my ears, and withdraw all my senses. I will 
eliminate from my thoughts all images of bodily things…I will regard all such 
images as vacuous, false and worthless. I will converse with myself and scrutinize 
myself more deeply; and in this way I will attempt to achieve, little by little, a 
more intimate knowledge of myself.”iv  
Descartes detached himself from the rules and standards of the world and looked within 
in order to find the ultimate and undeniable principles that could be the basis for building 
a true and logical system for understanding the laws of nature, which he believed would 
put human beings in concordance with the mind of God.  His quest was, in its essence, a 
transcendental one. By favoring introspection, discounting civilizational influences and in 
its indifference to moral constraints, the Cartesian pursuit of a valid science supported an 
increased focus on discovery of one’s own authentic being. 
The gradual triumph of capitalism and the predominance of wage labor provided 
yet another impetus toward development of the modern ideal of authenticity. In the old 
system, a worker’s inner feelings and sense of self were irrelevant, since each person was 
locked into an occupation that would last a lifetime. It was enough that the role was 
enacted properly.  But when work in the open market was no longer hereditary or 
connected to any larger meaning system, labor began to lose its capacity to define 
identity. Instead there was increasing alienation from work that seemed meaningless and, 
worse, destructive of the worker’s eternal soul.  Revulsion was especially directed toward 
the obligation to act obsequiously in order to please employers. Previously, subservience 
was part of a larger cosmic order of deference; now it stood athwart the new ideal of 
equality. v Workers had become capable of imagining something better for themselves, 
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but they also knew they could be dismissed for expressing resistance; as a result, for 
many their occupation was no longer a calling demanded by God, but rather became the 
enforced imposition of unwanted inferiority by an increasingly alien and antagonistic 
authority. 
As a result of all these factors, the early Protestant distaste for aristocratic artifice 
was easily extended to become a generalized contempt for role-playing in general. As one 
writer put it: “Born Originals, how comes it to pass that we die Copies? vi  To balance out 
the perceived distortion and repression of newly discovered individual personalities and 
universal souls in the competitive open marketplace, people began to believe that their 
common humanity demanded free sharing of genuine (that is, authentic) feelings when 
among intimates. The association of personal authenticity with familial intimacy, 
spontaneous emotional expressivity and an overturning of all forms of pretense also was 
connected to other aspects of the European transformation to modernity.  As Judith 
Shklar informs us: 
“(O)bsession with the true inner self and with the hypocrisy of playing social 
roles is related to the personal experiences of.... social mobility.... Romantic 
morality may reflect much of the anguish of people who leave the social world of 
their childhood behind them and adopt new manners and roles.  The true inner 
self is identified with one's childhood and family, and regret as well as guilt for 
having left them behind may render new ways artificial, false, and in some way a 
betrayal of that original self.  This personal self is seen as having a primacy that 
no later social role can claim; and indeed the latter may be despised as 
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demeaning, 'stereotyped,' or simply 'fake' - in any case less genuine than the 
primordial self". vii 
As a result of this split the workplace came to be pictured as an arena of battle, 
where combatants must put on carapaces and conceal their true feeling selves behind 
their standardized roles in order to protect their emotional vulnerability.  Emotional 
armor and constraining responsibilities may only be shed at home, among family or 
friends.  Only then can the worker feel free to express the feelings that have been kept 
bottled up at work. The rupture divides an instrumental public universe, which is 
experienced as inhibiting and destructive to the real self, from the emotionally expressive 
intimate home, where authentic being can blossom and be embraced. viii However, the 
content of the desired real self is necessarily undefined, a potential waiting to be revealed.  
The individual seeking self-realization becomes "the empty subject, capable of anything 
yet satisfied with nothing, the `long-distance runner' of modernity" ix 
The repudiation of public roles also had profound political implications. Judith 
Shklar’s remarks are again apposite: “If men accept themselves as the sum of their roles, 
it is said, then they are doomed to inequality.  Only if we assume that there is a self, apart 
from all social definition, which is capable of morality and therefore deserves respect, 
can we justify the claims of equality on which not only social justice but liberty itself  
depends." x  In other words, the claims for human equality that are essential to the 
liberalizing Enlightenment project imply and even require belief in a sacred and universal 
moral self, existing outside of, beneath, or beyond the social framework. However, the 
premise of a sacred presocial self does not only support the political right of each person 
to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, it also can motivate spiritually thirsty 
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individuals to search for the wellspring of the soul gushing beneath surface convention 
and appearance.  When individuals try to quench their spiritual yearnings by drinking 
from this deep inner source, sincerity has evolved into authenticity.   
The social consequences of the new emphasis on personal authenticity were 
profound.  Protestants throughout Europe began to declare that they were no longer 
obliged to follow whatever rules were handed down from above; instead, one’s duty was 
to make a personal judgment as to whether those rules were moral and equitable. These 
judgments could be made by referring to one’s inner light; that is, to the authentic moral 
truth emanating from within, and not by obedience to the conventions attached to social 
roles.  Soon enough, this critical attitude spread beyond the church. In the same fashion 
as a Protestant church member had a duty to leave the congregation and find another 
more in tune with his or her values, thinking men and women in Europe and later in 
America began to make personal decisions as to whether the state deserved their loyalty. 
If not, the citizen had an obligation to stand up in opposition to the injustice and, in the 
extreme case of France, to overturn the state and establish a new one that would offer 
them an authentic community, envisioned in a way not very different from a covenanted 
Protestant congregation.  
This new, spiritually tinged attitude toward the collective is captured by the 
historian Lynn Hunt, who argues that the revolutionary san culottes were motivated by 
their strong “belief in the possibility and desirability of 'transparency' between citizen and 
citizen, between the citizen and their government, between the individual and the general 
will.  For them, there should be no artificial manners or conventions separating men from 
each other and no institutions blocking free communication between citizens and their 
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delegates.”  Instead, there should only be the collective sharing of  “authentic emotion." xi  
Similarly, the great French historian Jules Michelet evoked the mystical aspect of the 
individual citizen’s relationship to the encompassing revolutionary commune. "Speak not 
of egotism.  History will answer here, quite as strongly as logic.  It was at the first 
moment of the Revolution, at the moment she was proclaiming the rights of the 
individual, it was then that the soul of France, far from shrinking, extended, embraced the 
whole world in sympathetic thought." xii  As we shall see in the case studies to follow, 
Michelet’s passionate invocation of the power of nationalism to ignite a form of religious 
fervor and commitment has become increasingly familiar in the modern era, when the 
authenticity of individuals and the genealogies of nations have been more and more 
intimately linked.  
The Literature of Authenticity  
The rise of authenticity as a value was echoed in European literature.  According 
to Trilling, xiii the first to write about personal authenticity was Moliere (1622-1673) who 
followed his satire Tartuffe with The Misanthrope, a comedy about the futile attempts of 
its hero Alceste to impose absolute standards of truthfulness on French court society. xiv  
The two plays are illustrations of two very different ways of understanding the world.  
Tartuffe is a fraud and flatterer who has no delusions about the self-aggrandizing nature 
of his trickery and deceit. For him, a sin is not a sin if it is not witnessed.  In contrast, 
Alceste asserts that “a man should be a man, and let his speech at every turn reveal his 
heart to each; his own true self should speak; our sentiments should never hide beneath 
vain compliments." xv  Moliere portrays Alceste as a ridiculous figure: a self-righteous 
narcissist whose unrealistic demands lead him to isolation and disaster.  He is “the new 
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hypocrite (who) simply adjusts his conscience by ascribing noble, disinterested, and 
altruistic intentions to all his behavior.  He is the sole instructor of his own conscience." 
xvi 
 Moliere’s satirical treatment of Alceste shows that personal authenticity, 
especially in its guise as authenticity of content, had not yet become a cultural ideal in the 
17th century, though its outlines were known. But soon authentic protagonists began to be 
seen in a more positive light.  Written in 1761, Denis Diderot’s dialogue between himself 
(the philosopher) and Rameau’s nephew marks a crucial step in this evolution.  The self-
aware hero, known only through his relationship with the famous composer, xvii is 
Protean, emotional, witty, and creative; Diderot (1713-1784) likens him to a grain of 
fermenting yeast restoring individuality and creativity to a stultified society.  But unlike 
the rigidly self-righteous nobleman, Alceste, Rameau’s nephew is an outsider, a con man, 
a liar, and a toady who willingly demeans himself for the entertainment of others.  This is 
necessary, he says, because the world is composed of the powerful and the weak.  The 
latter must cringe and crawl, playing the servile roles required of them. Even the courtier 
must fawn and simper before the king.  Rameau’s nephew, because he is powerless, must 
do the same, but unlike the rest, he does not delude himself about reality or his position. 
“I’m never false if my interest is to be true and never true if my interest is to be false.”  
And, unlike Alceste, he is able to live in the world, while at the same time seeing it for 
what it is.  xviii 
In this great book The Phenomenology of Mind, the romantic philosopher G.W.F. 
Hegel (1770-1831) depicted Rameau’s nephew as the first of a new type of radically 
authentic individuals who could no longer identify with society and instead embrace 
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fragmentation and marginalization, “rending and tearing everything” and pouring 
contemptuous scorn on the lifeless and fraudulent world of the bourgeoisie. Shameless, 
perverted, and “conscious of its own distraught and torn condition,” xix this figure is the 
prototype for Dostoevsky’s underground man, Sartre’s Saint Genet, and the other 
corrosively obscene, marginal, criminal and deviant anti-heroes of the modern age whose 
very existences repudiate a milieu that is taken to be hypocritical and oppressive.  As 
Marshall Berman puts it, “The search for authenticity, nearly everywhere we find it in 
modern times, is bound up with a radical rejection of things as they are.” xx   
However, in his anxiety to portray Rameau’s nephew as a paragon of 
revolutionary contempt for the status quo, Hegel ignored some of aspects of his character 
that would be influential to later romantic thought.  In particular, the nephew was an 
enthusiastic aesthete and a would-be artist who idealized natural spontaneous feeling in 
music and in the soul.  He tells Diderot “our passions have to be strong. The tenderness 
of the musician and the poet must be extreme…. We want it more energetic, less 
mannered, more genuine.” xxi  As a proponent of heartfelt feeling, Rameau’s nephew is a 
direct forerunner of another prototypical figure in the literature of authenticity, i.e., 
Goethe’s (1749-1832) most famous literary creation: young Werther, the wandering 
sketch artist and doomed lover.  Like Rameau’s nephew, Werther too sees through the 
restrictive constraints of bourgeois society. "Why does the stream of genius so seldom 
break out as a torrent, with roaring high waves, and shake your awed soul? - dear friends, 
because there are cool and composed gentlemen living on both banks, whose garden 
houses, tulip beds and cabbage fields would be devastated if they had not in good time 
known how to meet the threatening danger by building dams and ditches” (emphasis in 
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the original).   He too is a seeker after natural feeling in art, and he too defies social 
conventions.  
But where Rameau’s indomitable nephew refutes the hypocrisy of the world with 
his caustic laughter, Werther – a more sensitive and sentimental soul - finds solace in his 
heart, “which is my only pride, and the fountainhead of all - all strength, happiness and 
misery.  Anyone can know what I know.  My heart alone is my own."  xxii  Unhappily, his 
feckless heart leads him into a hopeless love affair.  When that fails, he descends into 
depression and kills himself, inspiring a rash of real-life suicides throughout Europe.  His 
is an early example of the secret affinity between authenticity and morbidity that was to 
be so characteristic of later German philosophy.   
Goethe’s attitude toward his young hero was ambiguous; while he too favored 
feeling, he feared its excesses, and the final stark image of Werther’s brains spilled across 
the floor is a chilling warning against viewing the world through the lens of one’s 
emotions.  Hegel was even more scathing toward what he regarded as a spectacularly 
destructive form of romantic consciousness, which he called “the law of the heart.”   This 
is the notion that one’s own true feelings provide an adequate basis for judgment and 
action.  Such a belief must, Hegel argued, lead to the sense that the external world, 
insofar as it does not conform to one’s desires, is alien and hateful.  Trying to 
universalize one’s own feelings inevitably leads to “consciousness gone crazy…. The 
heart-throb for the welfare of mankind passes therefore into the rage of frantic self-
conceit” as every consciousness seeks to impose its heart’s ambitions upon all others. xxiii  
Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) was one of the figures Hegel had in mind 
when he castigated the romantic faith in the law of the heart.  Rousseau, who believed 
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that Alceste had been quite correct to demand absolute honesty from the world, and from 
himself, became the first writer to present the reading public with a completely positive 
picture of an authentic individual who lives wholly according to his own emotional 
reality regardless of the opinions of others. It is no accident that this exemplary figure 
was Rousseau himself.  In his celebrated autobiography he shamelessly revealed himself 
as self-serving, cowardly, obsequious, masochistic, sexually deviant (he was aroused by 
being spanked), and paranoid. As he proudly proclaims “let the numberless legion of my 
fellow men gather round me and hear my confessions.  Let them groan at my depravities 
and blush for my misdeeds.  But let each one of them reveal his heart at the foot of thy 
throne with equal sincerity, and may any man who dares say, ‘I was a better man than 
he.’” xxiv  
Claiming superiority through the very act of exposing his worst defects heralded a 
new ideal of exploring and revealing one's essential nature – being true to oneself even 
while flying in the face of the moral standards of society. For Rousseau, as for his 
Calvinist forefathers, so long as a person heeds the prompting of his or her inner being, 
the judgments of others count for nothing. He concludes, “To live is to make use of our 
organs, our selves, our faculties, every part of ourselves which gives us the feeling of our 
own existence.  The man who has lived the longest is not he who has passed the greatest 
number of years, but he who has felt life.” xxv  
The Philosophy of Authenticity 
 Rousseau spent his career trying to understand the relationship between ‘the 
sentiment of being’ and the rules of civilization. As he famously remarked in the first 
page of The Social Contract,  “Man was born free, and everywhere he is in chains."  
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xxviAccording to Rousseau’s extremely influential anthropological theory of human 
origins, this degradation occurred because the growth of civilization has destroyed our 
original natures, which were motivated only by amour de soi (self-love); referring only to 
ourselves, we were without greed or ambition.  Only with the gradual development of the 
division of labor, and the differences in wealth and property that resulted, did humans 
learn to covet our neighbor's possessions and to puff ourselves up in hopes of exciting 
envy.  Motivated by amour propré (vanity), we sought prestige and status at the expense 
of others and became slaves of culture and tradition, living lives that are just play-acting. 
We are now only capable of experiencing ourselves when reflected in the eyes of others. 
If admired, we are proud; if held in contempt, we despise ourselves.  Civilization has 
robbed humans of our independence and deformed our true natures; it has made us slaves 
of power and imitators of fashion. Not only are we enchained; we have even grown to 
love our chains, and to embrace the social world that has destroyed our genuine being. 
Under these conditions, “The majority of men are quite unlike themselves, and often 
seem to transform themselves into different men.” xxvii 
For Rousseau, some remnants of the original authentic character of humanity 
could still be found in simpler cultures, which are closer to the pure state of nature.  As 
we will see, his nostalgia for the primitive and the essential was manifested in later 
theories of tribal purity, nationalism and ethnic pride.  Equally influential was his belief 
that children were repositories of humanity's fundamental innocence, which finds its 
modern expression in therapeutic injunctions to find authenticity by ‘getting in touch with 
the inner child.’ Finally, Rousseau also believed that certain receptive souls, such as his 
own, were more attuned to hear the authentic promptings of the heart.  They could shut 
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out daily reality and discover fulfillment through cultivation of reverie and other trance-
like states of consciousness.  “As long as this state lasts, we can call ourselves happy, not 
with a poor, incomplete and relative happiness such as we find in the pleasures of life, but 
with a sufficient, complete and perfect happiness which leaves no emptiness to be filled 
in the soul." xxviii In this passage, Rousseau prefigured the use of meditation, drug use, and 
other aids to transcending ordinary consciousness as aids in the quest for authenticity. 
Rousseau’s theories about authenticity met an enthusiastic response in Germany.  
There Herder, Schiller, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Goethe and others prepared the ground for 
a new vision of human existence proposed by Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900).  
Nietzsche detested the dull and predictable bourgeois world inhabited by “natures that are 
denied the true reaction, that of deeds, and compensate themselves with an imaginary 
revenge.” According to Neitzsche, the predominant Christian slave morality, motivated 
by a psychology of ressentiment against the strong and the vital, hides its baseness behind 
guilty conformity and soulless respectability.  Things become worse with modernity, 
which diffuses primal experience into a plethora of ‘objective’ abstractions, a stifling of 
the instincts, a debilitating sense of being “a strolling spectator” in life, and a feeble 
nostalgia for the passions of a lost past.   Under these dire circumstances, “no one dares 
appear as he is, but masks himself as a cultivated man, as a scholar, as a poet, as a 
politician.”  Redemption from this falsity cannot come from religion, since “nothing turns 
out to be divine any longer unless it be error, blindness, lies.’ xxix  Rather, the seeker must 
tear away the veils of convention, morality and faith.  “Let him follow his conscience, 
which calls out to him: 'Be yourself! What you're doing, supposing, desiring now - that's 
not you at all.’”  Those few who have achieved “productive uniqueness” are transformed, 
Lindholm  Chapter 2 
 16 
and shine with a “strange radiance.” xxx They are “the new, the unique, the incomparable, 
those who give themselves their own law, those who create themselves.” xxxi 
But there is an even more revolutionary aspect to Nietzsche’s ‘transvaluation of 
all values.’  This is his understanding of the will to power as the source of authenticity in 
a modern world where God is dead and nihilism rules. The will to power is defined as 
"above all an affect and specifically the affect of the command."  xxxii  Only when human 
beings actually experience a subjective sensation of vital empowerment can they realize 
themselves as authentic and self-actualized agents. "Great men, like great epochs, are 
explosive material in whom tremendous energy has been accumulated." xxxiii Unlike 
Goethe’s tenderhearted aesthete who seeks ultimate significance in hopeless love, 
Nietzsche’s heroes of authenticity are dangerous ‘blond beasts’ whose innate capacity to 
command is the ultimate value in a world lacking any other values:   
 What is good? - All that heightens the feeling of power, the will to 
power, power itself in man.   
 What is evil? - All that proceeds from weakness. 
 What is happiness? - The feeling that power increases - that resistance 
is overcome. xxxiv  
While Nietzsche’s high evaluation of the will to power can easily be interpreted 
as a paean to Fascist brutalism, in fact his historical consciousness and radical 
individualism would certainly have led him to disdain Nazi bureaucratic totalitarianism 
and Hitler worship.  The real apologist for Nazism among German philosophers was 
Nietzsche’s critic and most influential interpreter, Martin Heidegger, whose extraordinary 
book Being and Time stands as a landmark in the discourse of authenticity.  Although he 
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was far more inward, ahistorical, and mystical in his orientation than his precursors, 
Heidegger was like Nietzsche and Rousseau in his fear of immersion in the everyday, 
average, taken-for-granted reality of generalized others – das Man, the ‘they’ - who 
define our Dasein – our being.  In normal social life  “everyone is the other, and no one is 
himself…. The Self of everyday Dasein is the they-self which we distinguish from the 
authentic self – that is, from the Self which has been taken hold of in its own way.”  For 
Heidegger, the self as it ordinarily exists is inauthentic; it lives only in imitative and 
subservient relation to the anonymous and ubiquitous ‘they.’  Even curiosity, he says, is a 
way to avoid confronting authentic being by losing the self in restlessness and distraction, 
“never dwelling anywhere.” xxxv 
For Heidegger, to achieve authenticity one had to rigorously clear away the 
external and internal obstacles, temptations and delusions which bar the way to genuine 
spiritual self-realization. This effort was concretely expressed in the repudiation of the 
hustle and variety of cosmopolitan urban life, and in the cultivation of folk crafts, a plain 
unadorned language, and a simple, self-sufficient rural lifestyle.  Action was valued over 
discourse and reflection, which only obscured the purity of authentic Dasein.  It was the 
Nazi’s willingness to act forcefully, and seek a more primordial and emotional truth in 
mystical volk consciousness that convinced Heidegger – at least for a short time - of their 
potential to rejuvenate the German soul. However, there is perhaps a deeper conjunction 
between the two.  For Heidegger and his followers, the purpose of the obstacles to 
authentic self-realization, ontologically speaking, is to conceal the actual condition of the 
self from the self.  This actual condition is the temporality of existence – the harsh fact of 
one’s own death.  Authenticity then can only occur through coming to terms with fatality. 
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The connection between authenticity and death, hinted in the Greek etymology of 
authentes and by Werther’s descent into suicide, is here given full philosophical 
validation. xxxvi Is it a coincidence that the Nazis too embraced death as the completion of 
life, and made the death’s head their emblem?  
If Heidegger saw personal authenticity as the open-eyed engagement with one’s 
own temporality, his disciple Jean Paul Sartre had a different perspective. xxxvii Even 
though he pointedly refused to define authenticity in his masterpiece Being and 
Nothingness, xxxviii throughout he argues that the human being, because it possesses 
consciousness, is necessarily “a being which is what it is not and which is not what it is.”  
This paradox leads to an inevitable gap between the self as an object (in-itself) and as a 
transcendence of being (for-itself). Vacillating in the unbearable ‘metastable’ state 
between self-objectification and limitless and contentless freedom, the psyche tries to 
convince itself of its own solidity, and so feebly accepts the performance of its social 
roles as real, while still knowing they are merely poses.  Thus the waiter acting like a 
waiter is attempting to persuade himself (and others) that he is a waiter in the same way 
an inkwell is an inkwell.  But by the very act of performing the role, the waiter is 
alienated from himself.  “In vain do I fulfill the functions of a café waiter.  I can be he 
only in neutralized mode, as the actor is Hamlet, by mechanically making the typical 
gestures of my state.” xxxix For Sartre then, as for Heidegger, Nietzsche, and Rousseau, 
identification with social roles kills any possibility for authenticity. 
However, Sartre’s psychology is even more negative than that of his predecessors.  
Consciousness is inevitably drawn into bad faith because of the gap of nothingness that 
lies between constituting oneself as a thing, and the awareness that self-constitution is an 
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action which implies one is not that thing.  We are, Sartre says, lost in a kind of 
permanent self-ratifying and yet shaky delusion, in which we prop up our disintegrated 
existential condition and deny our ultimate responsibility for our own impossible 
freedom. Therefore, one cannot be one’s true self because doing so constitutes the self as 
a thing in order to escape contingency. xl  Yet somehow the struggle to be authentic 
continues as an active preconditioning principle in his system. xli  Sartre also attempts to 
understand relationships with other human beings through his notion of being ‘for 
others’.  However, it is significant that the prototypical ‘for others’ relationship in the 
Sartrean universe is one in which the voyeur peeking though the keyhole is himself spied 
upon.  In fact, for Sartre the content of relationships is more or less limited to shame (for 
the one viewed and objectified) and domination (for the viewer and objectifier).   
In his later work, Sartre gives more credit to the power of circumstance, and to the 
positive aspects of relationships with others, yet his basic message is that we can never 
achieve "an exit from the torment that comes from the futile attempt to secure ourselves 
in being, things, objects, and the world…. but we can free ourselves from the hell of 
pursuing it."  xlii Sartre thus presents us with an almost Calvinist vision of the authentic 
life, in which the anguished consciousness is caught in the existential paradox of being 
what it is not and not being what it is, and enmeshed in a world where there is no possible 
meaning or direction.  However, where the Calvinist could hope for salvation, the 
existentialist can only recognize the self as the “incontestable author” of its meaningless 
and incoherent fate. xliii  The solution is a kind of Buddhist or Stoic retreat from the world 
through the dissolution of desire. 
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As part of his own pursuit of authenticity, Sartre (like Rousseau) insisted on the 
personal and autobiographical sources of his preoccupations. Raised in a hypocritical 
upper-bourgeois household, as a child he accepted “that one feigns passion in order to 
feel it, that human life is a ceremony.  I had been convinced that we were created for the 
purpose of laughing at the act we put on for each other." xliv  Sartre reacted against 
refinement and mannered falsity all his life, vowing that he would never let any role 
subsume his real being, as the waiter is imprisoned in his performance.  Instead, he 
brought to the pursuit of authenticity not only a heroic and tragic ethic, but also a 
rebellious and yet queasy attraction to the perverse, the ugly, and the criminal – in this 
Sartre is the direct descendent of Rameau’s nephew.  
In the same vein, Sartre praised blacks and Jews for what he saw as their authentic 
spontaneity and emotional openness. Jews were especially valued because as exiles they 
did not have the objectifying delusion of belonging to any place and so came closer to 
being for-themselves.  Furthermore, as marginalized and oppressed, Jews (and blacks) 
could refuse bourgeois pretensions to universalism. "Jewish authenticity consists in 
choosing oneself as a Jew - that is, in realizing one's Jewish condition.... He knows that 
he is one who stands apart, untouchable, scorned, proscribed - and it is as such that he 
asserts his being." xlv  In other words, for Sartre the authentic Jew was precisely the Jew 
who lived out the stereotypes imposed upon them by anti-Semites.  For this reason, the 
truly authentic Jew (or black) could never be assimilated into French society.  But the 
actual content or consequences of the authenticity of marginalized others was never of 
great interest to Sartre.  For him, the ostracized served primarily to destabilize the 
bourgeois world and its pretenses to morality, purity, and authority.  As we shall see, this 
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stance fits well with the romantic appreciations of the authenticity of tribes, ethnic 
groups, and races that will be traced in later chapters. 
Sartre’s existentialism found many converts in the United States, where its focus 
on the individual’s responsibility for his or her own fate resonated with American cultural 
values. xlvi  But in fact, a popular native-grown cult of authenticity was already well 
developed in the United States as part of what William James (1842-1910) termed the 
faith of the once born or healthy minded; a belief system he prophesied would be the 
religion of the future.  Instead of concerning itself with the irreversible reality of human 
suffering, as existentialism and its continental predecessors had done, James notes that 
the American once born faith is optimistic and hopeful.  Pain and misery are illusions that 
individual human beings, by dint of spiritual discipline, can conquer.  This can be 
accomplished by tearing away the restrictive veils of reason, culture, and convention that 
separate the individual human soul from the sacred core of the self, as intuited by the 
heart. Purified, the believers can then touch the primal source of being and experience the 
expansive joys of cosmic unity and personal redemption. xlvii 
Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882) put the self-referential and spiritual aspect of 
this particularly American brand of authenticity best in his famous essay “Self-Reliance.” 
As he writes:  “I must be myself.  I cannot break myself any longer for you, or you.  
If you can love me for what I am, we shall be the happier.  If you cannot, I will still seek 
to deserve that you should.  I will not hide my tastes or aversions.  I will so trust that what 
is deep is holy, that I will do strongly before the sun and moon whatever only rejoices 
me, and the heart appoints.”  For Emerson, realizing and expressing one’s own inner truth 
was a priority above and beyond conventional notions of good and evil. “No law can be 
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sacred to me but that of my nature. Good and bad are but names very readily transferable 
to that or this; the only right is what is after my constitution; the only wrong what is 
against it.” xlviii  
James’ prediction that the pursuit of personal authenticity would dominate 
modern American spirituality can easily be verified by entering any bookstore. The 
shelves are weighted down with advice from New Age gurus and therapists who instruct 
seekers how to discipline themselves in order to unleash their inner child, reach a higher 
spiritual plateau, find a power source, heal themselves, free the thin person within the fat 
one, or play better tennis.  What is characteristic of these self-help books is that the 
techniques offered are not simply means to achieve a particular end, but rather are 
supposed to help the readers get in touch with their authentic selves.  Having achieved 
this ultimate goal, clarity of thought, happiness in relationships, success in business, a 
cure for angina, a slimmer figure, or a better backhand will necessarily follow.  While 
existentialists suffer in the alienating world, American once-born enthusiasts succeed in 
conquering it. 
The burgeoning popularity of an ethic of authenticity appalled a number of 
American cultural critics such as Allan Bloom, Daniel Bell and Christopher Lasch, who 
decried it as pure hedonistic narcissism masquerading as philosophy. Weak, self-
indulgent, and incapable of moral action or even of defending their own beliefs in any 
coherent fashion, the New Age propagandists were destroying the moral fiber of the 
nation in favor of feeble relativism and thoughtless self-indulgence.  In response, Charles 
Taylor mounted a spirited defense of authenticity rightly understood. He claimed that 
even the proponents of authenticity had been misled by an overemphasis on self-
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realization, and so had neglected the moral and social aspects of living an authentic life. 
“Self-choice as an ideal makes sense only because some issues are more significant than 
others.”  The most important and motivating issues, Taylor argued, arise in a modern 
context where positions are not ascribed, and people must prove their value to one 
another.  When identity is generated, not given, persons must discover and ratify who 
they really are through dialogue; the authentic person cannot exist alone, but must win 
the recognition and respect of others.  He concludes on a hopeful note: “perhaps the loss 
of a sense of belonging through a publicly defined order needs to be compensated by a 
stronger, more inner sense of linkage.” xlix 
Taylor rightly draws our attention to the social aspects of the pursuit of personal 
authenticity, but neither he nor other modern theorists devote much (or any) space to 
exploration of the implications and consequences of the pursuit of collective authenticity.  
Perhaps this is because the rise of individualism has been the most striking aspect of 
modernity, or perhaps it is because collective authenticity, as manifested in nationalism, 
has a bad reputation, since the exemplar case is Nazi Germany.  Whatever the cause, it is 
remarkable that the recent philosophical literature on authenticity has ignored collectives.  
This despite the fact that Romantic thinkers, Herder above all, believed that nations had 
their own essences, which needed to be preserved and expressed in the lives and works of 
the citizenry for them to be true to themselves.  This lacuna is correlated with another 
absence.  The emphasis in modern thought has consistently been on authenticity as 
correspondence – on being what one is.  But, as I noted in the introduction, authenticity 
has another meaning as well.  That is, the authenticity of origin, of genealogy, of roots.  
Certainly this overlaps with the notion of correspondence, but it points in a different 
Lindholm  Chapter 2 
 24 
direction, away from the self, and toward history, tradition, and ancestry, all of which are 
associated with collective identities of nation, tribe, and race. Finally, none of the critics 
or theorists of authenticity have had much to say about the way authenticity is actually 
pursued. l In the next chapters, I’ll use ethnographic and historical accounts to show how 
people look for authenticity, and how nation and individual, genealogy and identity, are 
intertwined in that quest. 
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